Al-Mahra

Until December 2025, Al‑Mahra had been mostly on the margins of the war, even as social friction and tribal disputes persisted. But the December events have pulled the governorate into the heart of the conflict, highlighting its strategic geography and the importance of its resources, especially its ports. An influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and regional players’ rivalries over control of the governorate have marked Al-Mahra’s demographic and socio-political setup and have made it susceptible to destabilizing outbursts. Environmental risks in Al-Mahra mostly relate to the management of its scarce natural resources, rising temperatures, and intensified rainfall leading to flash floods. These risks undermine social stability and contribute to communal tensions over basic resources and services which could support livelihoods, resilience-building and adaptation. 

The governorate of Al-Mahra is located in the far southeast of Yemen facing the Arabian Sea. Despite being the second largest governorate in Yemen in terms of territory, it is the least populous. While current population is estimated to be 198,000,¹ following a significant number of IDPs moved from other parts of Yemen, it is now thought to be as high as 226,946 residents.² This demographic shift has not remained without consequences. The people of Al-Mahra are known to hold a strong sense of local identity, and many consider themselves historically marginalized. The influx of IDPs into the governorate has caused increased frictions, with some Mahris seeing it as a demographic threat to their local identity.³

Many of the governorate’s most important economic activities – among them agriculture, fishing, husbandry, pastoralism, and beekeeping – relate to natural resources. This renders livelihoods mainly dependent on the quality of the environment and vulnerable to climate change risks. Al-Mahra keeps close commercial ties with Oman through cross-border trade, which the Sultanate has incentivized through friendly border policies.⁴ The close relationship with the neighbouring country has been an essential factor in sustaining the governorate’s economy during recent years of the conflict,⁵ providing it with a more comfortable economic position than other governorates. However, the country’s overall economic downturn has pushed Al-Mahra into increased precarity and dependency on remittances.⁶ Basic services, such as electricity or health infrastructure, are deteriorating and citizens are increasingly disgruntled by the local authorities’ incapacity to provide for its population.^{7, 8} 

Although Al‑Mahra is geographically distant from the capital Sana’a and the main frontlines of the national conflict, this relative isolation has not shielded it entirely from instability. While the governorate has experienced less violence than many other parts of Yemen since the outbreak of the war, it has still faced episodes of insecurity and localized tensions.⁹ Since January 2025, the deployment of the Saudi‑backed Nation’s Shield Forces (NSF) has further contributed to shifts in the local security landscape.¹⁰

These dynamics intensified dramatically in December 2025, when the STC’s eastward expansion into Al‑Mahra¹¹ was followed by a rapid counter‑offensive by the NSF, supported by Saudi airstrikes.¹² A governorate long perceived as relatively calm has now entered a new phase of insecurity and militarization. The December–January escalation effectively transformed Al‑Mahra into a frontline arena, reshaping local power balances and exposing the governorate to levels of confrontation it had previously avoided. 

Even before that, Al‑Mahra has become a main stage for the rivalry between regional actors with competing strategic interests, primarily Saudi Arabia and Oman.¹³ The deployment of the NSF has revived tensions with Oman, deepening political fragmentation among Mahris. Saudi Arabia seeks to consolidate influence, secure its borders, and curb Houthi weapons transfers, while Oman views Saudi and Salafi expansion as a direct threat to its security. 

For stability and security governance in Al‑Mahra continues to rely heavily on tribal structures, which have historically played a stabilizing role. However, many tribal leaders hold multiple nationalities and represent divergent external interests, turning tribal competition into a growing obstacle to peacebuilding.¹⁴ Although these dynamics have not yet escalated into large‑scale armed conflict, they have intensified polarization within the governorate. Segments of the population have repeatedly protested foreign military and political influence, while others support it, partly due to the development projects and investments associated with external actors.¹⁵

Al-Mahra is characterized by a rich diversity of geographies and climates, which has allowed for a wide range of species and habitats across the governorate.¹⁶ While Al-Mahra’s north is part of Yemen’s desert zone, its long coastline features a number of marine species and provides rich fishing grounds, and its eastern mountains feature lush green areas and farmland. The governorate is home to the Hawf region, a protected area of 300 square kilometres, on the border with Oman. As opposed to the mostly arid climate dominating the Arabian Peninsula, seasonal monsoons have provided the Hawf area with a diverse forest landscape, which is home to over 200 plant species and a variety of animals. The region also serves as the major site of Al-Mahra’s agriculture, allowing for the production of its famous frankincense and fruit.¹⁷ However, especially in the northern desert of the governorate, water runoff and precipitation rates are low, and productive groundwater aquifers are mostly concentrated around the capital Al-Ghaydah,¹⁸ rendering both water resources and fertile land scarce overall. 

Despite the seasonal monsoons in the mountainous south from June to September, Al-Mahra is characterized by a mostly arid climate, with high temperatures and low rainfall.¹⁹ Average temperatures throughout the year range from around 24°C to 26°C.²⁰ Al-Mahra’s temperature records from the past decades, as well as mid-range projections (SSP2-4.5), follow a steep upward trend (see fig. 1). Very hot days with a maximum temperature of over 40°C will become more frequent in the years to come. Meanwhile, average rainfall has varied widely over the past decades, with values ranging from roughly 47 mm to around 200 mm per year, but decreasing by about 20 mm (see fig. 2). While precipitation patterns appear volatile, GCM projections under SSP2-4.5 see rainfall slightly rising again between 2025-2100. Simultaneously, five-day cumulative precipitation is projected to increase by about 2 mm, while rainfall during the wettest days is expected to rise by about 17mm,²¹ suggesting a growing exposure to condensed, extreme rainfall events.

Fig. 1: Historical (left) and projected (right) temperatures in Al-Mahra governorate. Source: World Bank

Fig. 2: Historical (left) and projected (right) annual rainfall in Al-Mahra governorate. Source: World Bank

Al-Mahra’s rising temperatures, increasingly extreme rainfall patterns, and growing socio-economic fragility³, are undermining the relatively stable situation and becoming obstacles to peace. Survey data indicates that 42 percent of residents perceive conflicts in relation to the environment and natural resources, underscoring that environmental pressures are already a visible driver of local tensions. The most prominent environmental risks and its pathways to conflict and insecurity can be summarized as follows:

• Floods and extreme weather: Al-Mahra regularly experiences strong rainfall events, flash floods and cyclonic storms, such as Chapala in 2015, Luban in 2018, and Tej in 2023. Such incidents have repeatedly caused large-scale destruction of infrastructure and private property, displaced thousands of people, and led to numerous deaths and injuries.²² Besides their disastrous impacts on livelihoods, especially for farmers, pastoralists and fishers^,23 these events have also contributed to communal tensions. These cyclones washed away boundaries between properties, leading to disputes between landowners.²⁴ The impacts of extreme weather events are unequally distributed, leaving some groups of Al-Mahra’s population more vulnerable than others. IDPs living in camps, for instance, are exposed to a higher risk of losing their home or shelter or being injured as a consequence of a flood than families with more stable living conditions. These unequal impacts, in turn, are another potential driver for social division and hostility between groups. More frequent extreme weather events could also lead to renewed displacement and additional human mobility in the governorate, fuelling demographic rivalries. 

• Disaster management: As extreme weather becomes more frequent, the pressure on local authorities to protect the local population increases. Developing and establishing a comprehensive disaster risk reduction and management system as well as early warning structures in a country torn by war and economic downturn is a significant challenge. Many people in Al-Mahra report being dissatisfied with the local authorities’ response to these weather events, which has been criticized as unorganized and lacking of sufficient resource dedication and prioritization. Currently, warnings are inconsistent, originate from multiple sources, and are issued too late to allow for effective preparation, while no single authority is responsible for issuing them, further undermining disaster preparedness.²⁵ While 2022, a decree was issued to establish an early warning system, which is yet to be implemented. With climate projections forecasting an even higher occurrence of extreme rainfall events, the need for coordinated and effective responses will grow. If local leadership fails to tackle this challenge, levels of dissatisfaction with local governance and distrust in public institutions could increase, especially in a context like Al-Mahra with an already prominent perspective of historical neglect by the state. This frustration could escalate and feed into a growing popular wave of discontent.  

• Water availability and access: Due to its low and erratic rainfall rates and high temperatures, parts of the governorate are among Yemen’s most water-scarce areas since decades, and with temperatures projected to rise further, ensuring the provision of clean drinking water will become an even bigger challenge. The problem of water availability in Al-Mahra is threefold, relating to (1) an absolute shortage of water, mostly due to low and unreliable rainfall and the obstruction of waterways; (2) gaps in its water infrastructure, such as dams or wastewater recycling facilities; and (3) pollution of water, including groundwater and bottled water, and lacking quality enforcement.²⁶ Unsustainable compensation strategies such as well digging magnify the problem. Such factors increase competition and lead to disputes and exacerbate preexisting communal tensions, for instance between IDPs and residents. 

• Land degradation: Paired with heat, sand and dust storms, the lack of water also renders Al-Mahra’s arable lands vulnerable to desertification and degradation. This is unfolding itself in a situation where some agricultural lands have already been made available for housing to accommodate the growing population, while others have been lost to floods. The lack of compensation for such losses creates problems between and within communities over land ownership. ²⁷ Such issues also concern the fertile area of Hawf, which – while less affected by storms and related soil erosion than other parts of the governorate²⁸ – experiences infringements by people claiming ownership of lands and selling them or issuing constructions in the area, hunting of wild animals, and other human-made destruction,²⁹ all of which represent unsustainable survival coping mechanisms that further contribute to degradation and tensions. If this trend continues, it will not only intensify immediate communal disputes but also (continue to) threaten food security, which could lead to broader social unrest. 

• Waste and pollution: Ensuring waste and wastewater management for Al-Mahra’s growing population is a difficult task, and destruction through extreme weather has put additional pressure on existing infrastructure. Consequently, especially in Al-Mahra’s urban areas, a lack of landfills and insufficient waste collection infrastructure results in the unregulated dumping and burning of waste, including domestic debris, medical waste, and used lubricants or other commercial waste. Between 2014 and 2024, the number of landfills in Al‑Mahra increased from 17 to 44. Over the same period, their total area expanded from approximately 0.74 km² to 1.66 km², meaning the landfill footprint has more than doubled almost tripling in size.³⁰ Litter is piling up in the streets and fields and often blocks waterways, escalating the risk of flooding. Wastewater collection and treatment systems are insufficient or simply missing.³¹ This pollution through solid waste and wastewater deteriorates Al-Mahra’s environment, including available groundwater resources, and could aggravate related grievances among the population.³²
• Marine degradation: While Al-Mahra’s coasts have enabled relative economic stability, the expansion of industrial fishing has left, significant impacts on the governorate’s marine environment. Local fish populations have reduced, large trawlers are degrading seabeds, and chemical waste and oil spills are polluting local habitats.³³ Moreover, the increasingly intense floods and rising sea levels threaten habitats and infrastructure at Al-Mahra’s coasts, including fishery facilities.³⁴ Moreover, many of Al-Mahra’s coastal sites are most sensitive to shoreline change, erosion, and inundation.³⁵ In addition, oil slicks from passing ships and tankers in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean continue to contaminate the coastline³⁶, undermining marine biodiversity and threatening the livelihoods of coastal communities. This is causing problems especially for fishers who depend on marine resources to secure their income, which risks triggering tensions around available fish stock. It might also have fishers turn to alternative sources of income that causes even more environmental damage, such as tree cutting or smuggling and other illicit activities. 

The described challenges can constitute hurdles for peacemaking in Al-Mahra, but could also provide opportunities for cooperation. Entry points to tackle the governorate’s climate security risks, resolve disputes and prevent further tensions may include: 

• Strengthen local conflict resolution mechanisms to mediate tensions arising between host and displaced communities or individuals over land ownership or water access, and build awareness and capacity on environmentally induced tensions. 

• Elevate community voices in local disaster risk management and early warning to enhance inclusivity and effectiveness and agree on joint action for disaster risk reduction and early warning.  

• Strengthen local and national governance mechanisms and capacity for early warning and disaster management, as well as natural resource management and quality control. This could include the governor’s office, the Ministry for Water and Environment, the Environmental Protection Authority, as well as local police and security forces, and liaise them with community leaders. 

• Strengthen cooperative water and waste management under close involvement of local communities, for instance by developing joint water management plans, establishing community-level water and waste management committees, advocating for water and wastewater services, or supporting the development of water-sharing agreements between individuals and communities.  

• Support the development and enforcement of land rights and clear ownership structures to prevent tensions about farming lands in the Hawf area.  

• Prevent and build awareness about the adverse impacts of maladaptive coping mechanisms such as well digging, tree cutting, and smuggling, through livelihood diversification measures and qualification programmes.  

• Strengthen the regulation of fishing at Al-Mahra’s coasts, including through building capacity within local governance structures, and build awareness around the impacts and prevention of marine degradation.